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Abstract
We introduce a novel characterization of all Walrasian price vectors
in terms of forbidden over- and under demanded sets for monotone gross
substitute combinatorial auctions.
For ascending and descending auctions we suggest a universal frame-
work for finding the minimum or maximum Walrasian price vectors for
monotone gross substitute combinatorial auctions. An ascending (de-
scending) auction is guaranteed to find the minimum (maximum) Wal-
rasian if and only if it follows the suggested framework.
1 Introduction
A combinatorial auction is a market in which a set of heterogeneous indivisible
items is offered simultaneously to a group of bidders, who may have a different
value for every subset of them. Given a combinatorial auction, we wish to
find a mechanism that will allocate the items to the bidders whilst optimizing,
for instance, the social welfare, the sum of the bidders’ evaluations over their
allocated bundles.
In a mechanism that we call iterative auction the bidders are requested to
respond to repeated queries by an auctioneer until an allocation is determined.
The auctioneer queries can come, for instance, in the form of an item price
vector ; where the bidders respond by a preferable set of items under these
prices. The bidders utility for a set of items is the difference between the value
of this set and its price.
If in a price query iterative auction, the auctioneer is not allowed to decrease
prices, then the auction is called an ascending auction. An ascending auction is
a natural and popular auction format in practice1; whose theoretical properties
∗Research was done while the author was in University of Vienna and was funded by the
Vienna Science and Technology Fund (WWTF) through project ICT10-002. Author’s email:
oren.benzwi@gmail.com
1The English word “auction” is derived from the Latin word augeo¯ (and its derivations
augere, auctum) which means ‘increase’, ‘augment’ or ‘enlarge’.
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have been widely studied, see for example [8, 9, 7, 5, 6, 1, 2, 3, 14, 12]. In the
same manner, a price query iterative auction that cannot increase the prices is
called a descending auction2.
Given a price vector, if in an allocation all bidders are allocated a set of
maximum utility the allocation is called an envy free allocation and that vector
of prices is an envy free price vector. If in addition all items are allocated
then the allocation is denoted Walrasian allocation and the price vector is a
Walrasian price vector [20]. Both envy free and Walrasian naturally ‘satisfy’
the bidders, but the later also maximizes the global social welfare. Hence, a
Walrasian equilibrium is a most desirable outcome of a combinatorial auction;
still, it is not bound to exist and even if it does, it is not clear how to find it3.
Arguably, the most intuitive search dynamics for an equilibrium is by in-
creasing the prices of ‘excess demand’ sets and decreasing the prices of ‘excess
supply’ sets. This process was termed a taˆtonnement auction by Walras [20];
however, the notions of excess demand and excess supply are not easily definable
in general, as each bidder may prefer many different sets for a given price.
By restricting the valuation functions to certain classes, one can guarantee
the existence of Walrasian equilibrium. Lehmann et al. presented a hierar-
chy of bidder valuation classes, in which the unit demand valuation class is a
proper subclasses of the gross substitute class [15]. Gross substitute valuations,
introduced by Kelso and Crawford, are valuations that ‘support’ ascending auc-
tions. Loosely speaking, in a gross substitute valuation, a price increase cannot
decrease the ‘item demand’ of items for which the price was not changed. A
Walrasian equilibrium is guaranteed to exist if all valuations are gross substi-
tute [14].
We will restrict our attention in this work to auctions in which all bidder
valuations are monotone gross substitute. Gul and Stacchetti proved that these
valuations are maximal to guarantee equilibrium, by showing that for any non
gross substitute valuation, there exists a set of unit demand valuations, such that
together all valuations cannot guarantee equilibrium [11]. They also showed that
all Walrasian price vectors form a ‘lattice’ and hence have unique minimum and
maximum vectors. In another work, Gul and Stacchetti defined over demanded
sets for monotone gross substitute valuations and showed that a price vector
is envy free if and only if there is no over demanded set [12]. Lastly, they
introduced a unique excess demand set and showed that an ‘excess demand
ascending auction’, an auction that updates only prices of the excess demand
set, will result in the minimum Walrasian.
We use Gul and Stacchetti’s over demanded sets, together with a dual under
demanded sets definition and show that a price vector is Walrasian if and only
if there is no over demanded or under demanded set. We show further that a
price vector is also minimum (maximum) Walrasian if and only if there is no
weakly under (over) demanded sets.
2Ascending and descending auctions, especially for single items, are also known as English
and Dutch auctions, respectively.
3In contrast, envy free price vectors always exist and easy to find, as we can take, for
example, all prices to be so high that every bidder will only want an empty set.
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In other words, we generalize Gul and Stacchetti’s price characterization
from envy free price if and only if there is no over demanded set, to Walrasian
price vector if and only if there is no over demanded nor under demanded set.
We also introduce a generalize excess demand set system (where Gul and
Stacchetti’s excess demand is an element in this system) and prove that an
ascending auction will find the minimum Walrasian price vector if and only if
it will increase prices of excess demand sets. We show the same for descending
auctions.
2 Preliminaries
We introduce some of the definitions we use throughout the sequel. For a
complete view we add more definitions and known results on Appendix A.
2.1 Combinatorial auctions (the model)
In a combinatorial auction setting we are given m items, Ω, and n bidders,
where each bidder i ∈ [n] is associated with a valuation functions4 vi : 2Ω → N.
The valuation functions are normalized such that ∀i, vi(∅) = 0; and monotone
with respect to inclusion.
Bidder utilities are defined using an item price vector p = (p1, p2, ..., pm) ∈
N
m. Given p ∈ Nm, the utility of bidder i for a set of items S ⊆ Ω is defined to
be ui,p(S) = vi(S)− p(S), where p(S) =
∑
j∈S pj . A set S ⊆ Ω is demanded by
bidder i at price p if it maximizes the utility, i.e., ui,p(S) ≥ ui,p(T ), ∀T ⊆ Ω. The
set of all demanded sets for bidder i at p ∈ Nm is denoted Di(p) = {D|ui,p(D) ≥
ui,p(T ), ∀T ⊆ Ω}.
The bidders’ incentive comes from themaximum utility ui(p) function, which
is the utility of any demanded set D, i.e., ui(p) = ui,p(D). We omit the bidder’s
subscript and note ui(p) as u(p) and Di(p) as D(p) when the bidder is given or
plays no role. For singletons, we omit curly brackets and use j instead of {j}.
A solution or an outcome of a combinatorial auction is an allocation of the
items to the bidders. The social welfare of a solution is the sum of bidders
valuations over their allocated sets; that is, for an allocation {Si}i∈[n] the social
welfare is
∑
i vi(Si).
2.2 Unit demand valuation
A unit demand valuation v is defined by m values v(j), ∀j ∈ Ω; with v(S) =
maxj∈S v(j), for S ⊆ Ω.
Assume all valuations are unit demand; we use the following two functions
for S ⊆ Ω and p ∈ Nm: Λp(S) = {i|Di(p) ⊆ S} and Ξp(S) = {i|Di(p) ∩ S 6= ∅}.
4It is natural to assume that valuations are non-negative rationals and then, maybe after
some scaling, one can assume even that valuations are natural numbers (including 0). We
will assume later also that the prices are natural numbers, but this assumption is not needed
given the first one. Our results will hold also for real number valuations, but the proofs need
to be more delicate.
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Mishra and Talman define S ⊆ Ω to be over demanded for p ∈ Nm if |Λp(S)| ≥
|S| and under demanded if |Ξp(S)| ≤ |S|5 [17]. Andersson et. al define S ⊆ Ω
to be in excess demand for p if ∀T ⊆ S, |Λp(S) ∩ Ξp(T )| > |T | [1].
2.3 Walrasian equilibrium and gross substitute valuation
A p ∈ Nm and a partition6 {Si ⊆ Ω}i∈[n] such that every bidder is allocated
a demand set in p is called Walrasian equilibrium. Walrasian equilibrium does
not have to exist but if it does it is known that it also maximizes the social
welfare (a variant of the first welfare theorem, see for example [6]). Maximizing
the social welfare can be addressed by the following integer linear program, IP :
max
∑
i∈[n], S⊆Ω
xi,S · vi(S)
s.t.
∑
i∈[n], S|j∈S
xi,S ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ Ω
∑
S⊆Ω
xi,S ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ [n]
xi,S ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ [n], S ⊆ Ω
If we relax integrality constraints of the program we get a linear program whose
dual, DLP , is:
min
∑
i∈[n]
pii +
∑
j∈Ω
pj
s.t. pii +
∑
j∈S
pj ≥ vi(S) ∀i ∈ [n], S ⊆ Ω
pii ≥ 0, pj ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [n], j ∈ Ω
Bikhchandani and Mamer [4] observed that a Walrasian equilibrium exists
if and only if the value of the maximum social welfare, i.e., a solution to the
IP , equals the optimum in the dual problem DLP . Moreover, in this case, the
set of the optimal dual variables {pj}j∈Ω is a Walrasian price vector and the
variables pii are such that pii = ui(p) the maximum utility functions for p, hence
determined by p.
For p ∈ Nm we mark a lower bound on the dual objective (the Lyapunov)
by L(p) =
∑
i ui(p) +
∑
j pj . This lower bound determines feasible dual vari-
ables for every p and is tight for an optimum7. The following is then based on
Bikhchandani and Mamer [4] and Ausubel [2].
5Note the resemblance to Hall’s marriage theorem [13].
6Recall that a partition is an exact allocation, that is, an allocation that allocates all items.
In general, a Walrasian allocation does not have to be a partition, but for monotone valuations
it can be assumed so.
7Note that the Lyapunov is dual feasible by definition, hence it is also an upper bound for
the social welfare value.
Corollary 2.1 p ∈ Nm is Walrasian if and only if its Lyapunov L(p) is mini-
mum with respect to all possible prices p.
We look at the space of (vectors from or) functions on Ω as ordered by the
domination order, namely, for p, q : Ω 7→ N, p ≤ q if for every j ∈ Ω, pj ≤ qj . If
p ≤ q we also say that p is dominated by q. For two price vectors p, q ∈ Nm we
note by p∧q and p∨q the minimum (meet) and the maximum (join) coordinate-
wise, respectively. That is, (p ∧ q)j = min{pj, qj} and (p ∨ q)j = max{pj, qj}.
For two price vectors p, q ∈ Nm and an S ⊆ Ω, let S=(p, q) = {j ∈ S|pj =
qj}. The gross substitute class of valuation is the class in which a player never
drops an item whose price was not increased in an ascending auction dynamics;
formally:
Gross substitute [14] A valuation is gross substitute if for every p ∈ Nm and
S ∈ D(p), for every price vector q ≥ p, ∃S′ ∈ D(q) such that S=(p, q) ⊆ S′.
In other words, if S is a demanded set for p, and q ≥ p then there is a
demand set for q that contains all elements j ∈ S for which the price did not
change. Kelso and Crawford proved that if all valuations are gross substitute,
then a Walrasian equilibrium is guaranteed to exist [14].
2.4 Ascending and descending auctions
An ascending auction is an iterative algorithm which starts with a low price
vector (we assume p = 0m, the 0 vector) and in each iteration finds a set of
items to increase, we assume the increase is one unit of price for every item in
the increased set. We denote the increase of each item in S ⊆ Ω by one unit
from p ∈ Nm by p+ 1S , that is, for each j ∈ Ω,
(p+ 1S)j =
{
pj + 1 if j ∈ S
pj else
In the same manner, a descending auction is an iterative algorithm which starts
with a high price vector, we can assume ∀j ∈ Ω, pj = maxi vi(Ω). In each
iteration the algorithm finds a set of items to decrease, where the decrease is
again one unit of price for every item in the decreased set. We denote the
decrease of each item in S ⊆ Ω by one unit from p ∈ Nm by p− 1S where,8
(p− 1S)j =
{
pj − 1 if j ∈ S
pj else
3 Accommodating the Lyapunov
3.1 Over- and under-demand
Next we define two important functions that will help us characterize the Wal-
rasian prices and later also characterize a new framework for ascending and
8We implicitly assume that if p ∈ Nm is decreased for S ⊆ Ω, then ∀j ∈ S, pj ≥ 1.
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descending auctions. Gul and Stacchetti defined a requirement function that we
will use in order to define over-demanded sets ; and then we will define a dual
redundant function and use it to define under-demanded sets. For intuition, we
think about the demand of a bidder when we increase the prices of a set of items.
Clearly, we know that ∀p ∈ Nm, S, T ⊆ Ω, u(p+ 1S) ≥ up(T )− |S ∩ T |, as the
left hand side is the maximum utility over all possible sets and the right hand
side is the utility of a specific set. Specifically, taking T ∈ D(p), a new demand
set can arise but we can be assured that the worse case for that bidder is just an
old demand set which intersect the least with the set of items whose prices were
increased. Same thing with decreasing prices, ∀p ∈ Nm, S, T ⊆ Ω, u(p− 1S) ≥
up(T ) + |S ∩ T |, here the worse is just a demand set that intersect the most
with the set of items whose prices were decreased. We will see later that in
terms of cardinality, for monotone gross substitute valuations, these measures
are accurate.
Requirement function [12] Given p ∈ Nm and bidder i, the requirement of
i on p for S ⊆ Ω is defined to be li,p(S) = minD∈Di(p) |S ∩D|. The auction
requirement on p for S ⊆ Ω is defined to be lp(S) =
∑
i∈[n] li,p(S).
Redundant function For p ∈ Nm and bidder i, the redundant of i on p for
S ⊆ Ω is defined to be hi,p(S) = maxD∈Di(p) |S ∩D|. The auction redundant
on p for S ⊆ Ω is defined to be hp(S) =
∑
i∈[n] hi,p(S).
When the bidder is known we use lp(·) and hp(·) (sub-script p) as the re-
quirement and redundant of a bidder on p for a set of items; we use lp(·) and
hp(·) (supper-script p) only for the auction requirement and auction redundant
functions (of all bidders). With the help of the requirement and redundant
functions we are ready to define over- and under-demanded sets.
Over-demand [12] Given p ∈ Nm the set S ⊆ Ω is (weakly) over-demanded
if (lp(S) ≥ |S|), lp(S) > |S|.
Under-demand Given p ∈ Nm the set S ⊆ Ω is (weakly) under-demanded if
(hp(S) ≤ |S|), hp(S) < |S|.
For p ∈ Nm we note the collection of all over-demanded, (weakly over-demanded)
and under-demanded, (weakly under-demanded) sets by OD(p), (WOD(p)) and
UD(p), (WUD(p)), respectively.
3.2 New gross substitute definitions
More than three decades since the class of gross substitute was introduced by
Kelso and Crawford [14] we gradually reveal its enormous importance and, at the
same time, the tremendous effort we still need to overgo in order to clearly un-
derstand it. After some seminal initial works, such as Gul and Stacchetti [11, 12],
another keen step towards this end was made recently by Paes-Leme in a sur-
vey that sketches abundant interesting class’ properties and connects plentiful
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different intriguing definitions [18]. We present yet two more novel definitions
and hope that their introduction will serve as another step towards this goal as
well.
Consider again what happens to a single bidder’s utility function on p ∈ Nm
if we increase or decrease p for all items of a predefined S ⊆ Ω. It is clear by the
definitions of lp(S) and hp(S) that u(p − 1S) ≥ u(p) + hp(S) and u(p + 1S) ≥
u(p)−lp(S), since the sets that achieved the maximum or minimum for p are still
available for p− 1S and p+ 1S . We show next that monotone gross substitute
valuations are the only valuations for which these two inequalities are equalities
for every p ∈ Nm and S ⊆ Ω.
Theorem 3.1 Given a valuation over 2Ω the following are equivalent.
1. ∀p ∈ Nm and S ⊆ Ω, u(p) = u(p− 1S)− hp(S)
2. ∀p ∈ Nm and S ⊆ Ω, u(p) = u(p+ 1S) + lp(S)
3. The valuation is monotone gross substitute.
Proof We will see a cyclic derivation
• 1⇒ 2
By definition, ∀p ∈ Nm and S ⊆ Ω, u(p) ≤ u(p+1S)+ lp(S). Assume ∃p ∈
N
m and S ⊆ Ω, u(p) < u(p+1S)+ lp(S) and look now on the price vector
p+1S and a set D ∈ D(p+1S) such that D = argmaxD∈D(p+1S) |D ∩ S|.
Since u(p+1S) = u(p+1S−1S)−hp+1S(S) we have that lp(S) > hp+1S (S).
But by definition of D, u(p) = u(p + 1S) + |S ∩ D| = up(D), hence,
D ∈ D(p) and clearly, lp(S) ≤ hp+1S (S).
• 2⇒ 3
Again, by definition of lp(S) it holds that u(p) ≤ u(p + 1S) + lp(S). We
show that for a non-gross substitute valuation there exist p ∈ Nm and
an S ⊆ Ω such that u(p) < u(p + 1S) + lp(S). Let q, A, j1, j2, j3 be as
described in Theorem A.1 and recall that either D(q) = {A,A ∪ {j1, j2}}
or D(q) = {A ∪ {j3}, A ∪ {j1, j2}}. By monotonicity v(A) ≤ v(A ∪ {j1})
(respectively, v(A∪{j3}) ≤ v(A∪{j1, j3})) hence the fact that A∪{j1} /∈
D(q) (resp., A ∪ {j1, j3} /∈ D(q)) means that qj1 > 0. For p = q − 1j1
and S = {j1, j2} we have that ∀D ∈ D(p), j1, j2 ∈ D; or else u(q) <
up(A ∪ {j1, j2}) ≤ up(D) ≤ uq(D) + 1 ≤ u(q), where the last inequality
comes from the assumption that j1, j2 ∈ D does not hold and the fact
that up(A) < up(A ∪ {j1, j2}) and up(A ∪ {j3}) < up(A ∪ {j1, j2}), so
D /∈ D(q). Hence we conclude that lp(S) = 2 and therefore, u(p) =
uq(A ∪ {j1, j2}) + 1 < uq(A ∪ {j1, j2}) + 2 ≤ u(p+ 1S) + lp(S).
• 3⇒ 1
Indeed, by definition of the redundant function h, u(p) ≤ u(p−1S)−hp(S).
We will show next that for any S′ ⊆ Ω, u(p) ≥ up−1S(S
′)−hp(S) hence the
direction will follow. Assume u(p)− up(S′) = k, we show that ∃R,D ⊆ Ω
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such that D ∈ D(p), |R| ≤ k and S′ ⊆ D ∪ R. Note that then |S′ ∩ S| ≤
hp(S) + k so up−1S(S
′) ≤ up(S′) + hp(S) + k ≤ u(p) + hp(S) as claimed.
To show the existence of D,R we use induction on k. For k = 0 just take
D = S′ and R = ∅. So k > 0 hence by the single improvement property ∃T
such that up(T ) > up(S
′) and |S′ \ T | ≤ 1. Now since up(T ) > up(S
′) we
can apply the induction hypothesis on T and find two sets D,R′ such that
D ∈ D(p), |R′| ≤ u(p)− up(T ) and T ⊆ D ∪R′. We claim that the same
set D and the set R = R′∪ (S′ \T ) suffice. Indeed, S′ ⊆ D∪R, D ∈ D(p)
and |R| ≤ u(p)− up(T )+ 1 ≤ up− up(S′) ≤ k. Hence, for monotone gross
substitute valuation it holds that u(p) = u(p− 1S)− hp(S).
The next two corollaries play a key role in the following price characteri-
zation result; the first one follows the definitions of the Lyapunov and the re-
dundant/requirement of all bidders; adding the over-/under-demand and Corol-
lary 2.1 we derive the second.
Corollary 3.2 (of Theorem 3.1) Assume all valuations are monotone gross
substitute, then for each p ∈ Nm and each S ⊆ Ω
1. L(p− 1S) = L(p) + hp(S)− |S|
2. L(p+ 1S) = L(p)− lp(S) + |S|
Corollary 3.3 (of Corollary 2.1 and Corollary 3.2) When all valuations
are monotone gross substitute, if for p ∈ Nm there exists an under- or over-
demanded set, then L(p) is not minimum and p is not a Walrasian price vector.
4 Price characterization
We present now the main Walrasian price characterization. This theorem in
turn, is the main building block in the correctness’ proof of our ascending and
descending auctions framework later.
Theorem 4.1 If all valuations are monotone gross substitute then given p ∈
N
m the following hold:
• p is Walrasian if and only if there is no over-demanded and no under-
demanded set.
• p is minimum Walrasian if and only if there is no over-demanded and no
non-trivial weakly under-demanded set.
• p is maximum Walrasian if and only if there is no non-trivial weakly over-
demanded and no under-demanded set.
Proof One direction of the first item is Corollary 3.3. Indeed, if p ∈ Nm
is a Walrasian price vector then by Corollary 2.1 the dual objective L(p) is
minimum and hence there cannot be any under- or over-demanded set. For the
8
other direction assume that for p ∈ Nm there are no over-demanded or under-
demanded sets; we will show that L(p) is minimum, hence, by Corollary 2.1,
p is Walrasian. Assume L(p) is not minimum and let q ∈ Nm be the ‘closest’
such that L(q) < L(p), that is, q minimizes (over all price vectors q̂ ∈ Nm, such
that L(q̂) < L(p)) the dist(p, q) =
∑
j |pj − qj |. Let x
− be a vector such that
x−j = max {pj − qj , 0} and let x
+ be a vector such that x+j = max {qj − pj , 0}.
Let p− = p− x− and p+ = p+ x+.
Claim 4.2 Either p dominates q (p ≥ q) or q dominates p (q ≥ p).
Proof Assume not, that is, p− 6= p and p+ 6= p; and by definition of q, L(p−) =
L(p+) = L(p). We will use the submodularity of the Lyapunov, Lemma A.2, in
order to show that L(q) ≥ L(p) which is a contradiction to q’s definition, hence,
either x− = 0m and p ≤ q or x+ = 0m and p ≥ q.
By the Lyapunov submodularity L(p ∧ q) + L(p ∨ q) ≤ L(p) + L(q). But
since p ∧ q = p− and p ∨ q = p+ and the fact that L(p−) = L(p+) = L(p), we
come to a contradiction.
Let R = {j|pj 6= qj} and note that if q = p+1R or q = p−1R then by Corol-
lary 3.2 and the fact that there are no over-demanded or under-demanded sets
L(p) ≤ L(q) contradicting the existence of such a q. Assume now that q ≥ p. Let
R1 = R, R2 = {j|qj − pj ≥ 2}, R3 = {j|qj − pj ≥ 3} · · · Rτ = {j|qj − pj ≥ τ}.
Note that R1 ⊇ R2 ⊇ R3 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Rτ and that q = p + 1R1 + 1R2 +
· · · + 1Rτ . By repeatedly applying Corollary 3.2 we get that L(q) = L(p) −∑
k∈[τ ] l
p+
∑
η<τ 1Rη (Rk) +
∑
k |Rk|, hence,
∑
k∈[τ ] l
p+
∑
η<τ 1Rη (Rk) >
∑
k |Rk|.
By a corollary of Theorem 2 of Gul and Stacchetti (see Theorem A.4 in the ap-
pendix) it can be shown that lp+
∑
η<τ 1Rη (Rk) ≤ lp(Rk). Together we conclude
that
∑
k∈[τ ] l
p(Rk) >
∑
k |Rk|, so ∃η for which l
p(Rη) > |Rη| which contradicts
the fact that q is the closest to p. The case for p ≥ q is symmetric, therefore
omitted.
Next we show that there is also no non-trivial weakly under-demanded set
if and only if p is minimum Walrasian. Assume first that there is no non-
trivial set of weakly under-demand and that exists q ∈ Nm such that q 6≥ p
and L(q) = L(p). Recall that there is no non-trivial weakly under-demanded
set means that ∀S 6= ∅, hp(S) > |S| and that the lattice property of Walrasian
prices (Lemma A.3) means that if ∃q 6≥ p such that L(q) = L(p), then ∃q′ ≤ p
such that q′ 6= p and L(q′) = L(p). By convexity and the fact that L(p)
is minimum, we can assume that q′ = p − 1S , but then by Corollary 3.2, S
is weakly under-demanded, a contradiction. For the other direction, if p is
minimum Walrasian then ∀q ≤ p, if p 6= q then L(p) < L(q). In particular,
∀S 6= ∅, L(p) < L(p − 1S); so, again by Corollary 3.2, S is not weakly under-
demanded. This completes the proof that there is no non-trivial weakly under-
demanded set if and only if p is minimum Walrasian. The proof that maximum
Walrasian is the absence of non-trivial weakly over-demanded sets is similar.
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5 Auctions’ general framework
We define next two more set collections, excess demand and dearth demand,
that will be used for the ascending and descending auctions framework. As
noted, if an ascending auction only increase prices of sets in excess demand, it
is guaranteed to end in the minimum Walrasian price. If the auction increases
prices of a set not in excess demand, it might not find the minimum Walrasian
equilibrium.
In the same manner, if a descending auction only decreases prices of ele-
ments in sets of dearth demand, i.e., excess supply, it will end in the maximum
Walrasian price; if it decreases prices of a set not in dearth demand, it might
not be able to find the maximum Walrasian price vector.
Excess demand Given p ∈ Nm, S ⊆ Ω is in excess demand if S ∈ OD(p) and
∀T ⊆ S, if T 6= ∅, then T /∈ WUD(p+ 1S).
Dearth demand Given p ∈ Nm, S ⊆ Ω is in dearth demand if S ∈ UD(p) and
∀T ⊆ S, if T 6= ∅, then T /∈ WOD(p− 1S).
For p ∈ Nm we note the collection of all excess demanded sets by ED(p) and
the collection of all dearth demanded sets by DD(p).
It is crucial to mention that known ascending and descending auctions are
special cases of ‘excess’ or ‘dearth’ demand auctions. In [3] it is proved that
the auctions of Gul and Stacchetti [12] and of Ausubel [2] are identical. These
auctions increase only a set called a minimal minimizer9 or decrease a set called
a maximal minimizer. We show next that these are strict special cases of the
excess or dearth demand auctions.
Minimal minimizer [2] S ⊆ Ω is a minimal minimizer for p ∈ Nm if L(p +
1S) < L(p) and ∀T ⊆ Ω, L(p + 1S) ≤ L(p + 1T ) where the inequality is strict
for T ⊂ S.
Maximal minimizer [2] S ⊆ Ω is a maximal minimizer for p ∈ Nm if L(p−
1S) < L(p) and ∀T ⊆ Ω, L(p − 1S) ≤ L(p − 1T ) where the inequality is strict
for T ⊂ S.
Lemma 5.1 For p ∈ Nm,
• If S ⊆ Ω is a minimal minimizer for p then S ∈ ED(p).
• If S ⊆ Ω is a maximal minimizer for p then S ∈ DD(p).
Proof We will show it for minimal minimizer, the proof for maximal minimizer
is similar. If S is a minimal minimizer for p ∈ Nm then S ∈ OD(p) by definition.
If S /∈ ED(p) then ∃T ⊂ S such that T ∈ WUD(p + 1S) and T 6= ∅, then
L(p + 1S − 1T ) ≤ L(p + 1S) but then since T ⊂ S, L(p + 1S\T ) ≤ L(p + 1S),
hence S \ T is a witness for S not being p’s minimal minimizer10.
9Minimal minimizer is called excess demand on [12].
10The other direction does not hold, see proof in the appendix, hence the new definitions
strictly generalize the formers.
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Note also that, after proving the correctness of excess or dearth demand auctions
framework, new ascending or descending auctions (and old ones) can be proved
easily by showing that only sets in excess demand are increased or only sets
in dearth demand are decreased. In particular, Theorem 5.4 and Lemma 5.1
provide a concise proof for the well known Gul and Stacchetti’s auction [12].
5.1 Ascending
We want to show next that an excess demand auction framework, i.e., an as-
cending auction that only increases sets of excess demand and terminates when
there is none, will find the minimum Walrasian price vector. By Theorem 4.1
it is enough to show that for the resulting price of the auction, there is no
over-demanded set and no non-trivial weakly under-demanded set.
Lemma 5.2 If for p ∈ Nm there is no non-trivial set in weakly under-demand,
WUD(p) = {∅} and S ⊆ Ω is in excess demand, S ∈ ED(p), then there is
no non-trivial set in weakly under-demand after increasing the price vector for
every element of S, i.e., WUD(p+ 1S) = {∅}.
Proof Recall that by Corollary 3.2, ∀T, L(p− 1T ) = L(p) + hp(T )− |T |. The
assumption that WUD(p) = {∅} then implies ∀T 6= ∅, L(p − 1T ) > L(p).
Assume that ∃T ∈ WUD(p + 1S) and T 6= ∅. Since S ∈ ED(p), T 6⊆ S; by
Corollary 3.2, L(p+ 1S − 1T ) ≤ L(p+ 1S).
Assume first that S ∩ T = ∅, then (p + 1S − 1T ) ∧ p = p − 1T and (p +
1S − 1T ) ∨ p = p + 1S . We apply the Lyapunov submodularity, Lemma A.2
and get that L(p + 1S) + L(p − 1T ) ≤ L(p) + L(p + 1S − 1T ). Now by the
assumption that L(p+1S− 1T ) ≤ L(p+1S) we conclude that L(p− 1T ) ≤ L(p)
which is a contradiction to the assumption that there are no non-trivial weakly
under-demanded sets in p.
Now if S ∩ T 6= ∅ by the definition of excess demand we know that S ∩ T /∈
WUD(p+1S), hence, h
p+1S (S∩T ) > |S∩T | and by Corollary 3.2, L(p+1S) =
L(p+1S−1S∩T )−hp+1S(S∩T )+ |S∩T | < L(p+1S\T ). By the assumption that
T ∈WUD(p+1S) together with Corollary 3.2 we know that L(p+1S\T−1T\S) =
L(p+1S−1T ) ≤ L(p+1S) so we have that L(p+1S\T−1T\S) < L(p+1S\T ). But
{S \ T }∩ {T \ S} = ∅ so we can again conclude that L(p− 1T\S) ≤ L(p) which
is, since T \ S 6= ∅, a contradiction to the assumption that WUD(p) = {∅}.
Lemma 5.3 OD(p) 6= ∅ → ED(p) 6= ∅.
Proof For S ∈ OD(p) either S ∈ ED(p) or ∃T ⊆ S such that ∅ 6= T ∈
WUD(p + 1S). But then by Corollary 3.2, we have that L(p + 1S − 1T ) =
L(p+ 1S) + h
p+1S (T )− |T | ≤ L(p+ 1S) = L(p)− lp(S) + |S| < L(p) where the
first inequality is the fact that T ∈ WUD(p + 1S) and the second comes from
S ∈ OD(p). Hence, since T ⊆ S, we conclude that S \ T ∈ OD(p); but since
T 6= ∅ and T 6= S we can proceed inductively with S \ T instead of S.
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Theorem 5.4 If all valuations are monotone gross substitute then any ascend-
ing auction that only updates prices of all items that belong to an excess demand
set and terminates when there is none, will result in the minimum Walrasian
price vector.
Proof Every excess ascending auction starts with a price vector pstart = 0m
which guarantees that WUD(pstart) = {∅}; therefore, by Lemma 5.2, also it
ends in a price vector pend, for which WUD(pend) = {∅}. By Lemma 5.3,
if ∃S ∈ OD(pend) then also ∃T ∈ ED(pend) so pend is not the result of the
auction. We conclude that OD(pend) = ∅ and WUD(pend) = {∅}, hence, by
Theorem 4.1, pend is the minimum Walrasian price vector.
The last theorem shows the ‘sufficiency’ of the excess demand auction frame-
work. To show the ‘necessity’ we state a lemma saying that if we increase prices
of a non-excess demand set then for sure we will create a weakly under-demanded
set. Informally, note that this is ‘best possible’ by the nature of lower bounds,
as one cannot show that other algorithms will fail on all inputs.
Lemma 5.5 ∅ 6= S /∈ ED(p)→WUD(p+ 1S) 6= {∅}.
Proof If S /∈ ED(p) then either S ∈ OD(p)∧∃T ∈ WUD(p+1S), T 6= ∅, hence
we are done; or S /∈ OD(p), but then, by Corollary 3.2, since L(p) ≤ L(p+1S),
S ∈ WUD(p+ 1S).
5.2 Descending
Lemma 5.6 If for p ∈ Nm there is no ∅ 6= S ⊆ Ω in weakly over-demand,
WOD(p) = {∅} and S ⊆ Ω is in dearth demand, S ∈ DD(p), then there is no
non-trivial set in weakly over-demand after decreasing the price vector for every
element of S, i.e., WOD(p− 1S) = {∅}.
Proof Recall that by Corollary 3.2 ∀T, L(p + 1T ) = L(p) − lp(T ) + |T |. The
assumption that WOD(p) = {∅} then implies ∀T 6= ∅, L(p + 1T ) > L(p).
Assume that ∃T ∈ WOD(p − 1S) then by Corollary 3.2, L(p − 1S + 1T ) ≤
L(p− 1S).
Assume first that S ∩ T = ∅, then (p − 1S + 1T ) ∨ p = p + 1T and (p −
1S + 1T ) ∧ p = p − 1S. We apply the submodularity lemma and get that
L(p− 1S) + L(p+ 1T ) ≤ L(p) + L(p− 1S + 1T ). Now by the assumption that
L(p − 1S + 1T ) ≤ L(p − 1S) we conclude that L(p + 1T ) ≤ L(p) which is a
contradiction to the assumption that there are no weakly over-demanded sets
in p.
Now if S ∩ T 6= ∅ we will show that also T \ S ∈ WOD(p − 1S) which we
just contradicted. Indeed, by the definition of dearth demand we know that
S ∩ T /∈ WOD(p − 1S), hence, lp−1S (S ∩ T ) < |S ∩ T | and by Corollary 3.2,
L(p− 1S) < L(p− 1S\T ). By the assumption that T ∈ WOD(p− 1S) together
with Corollary 3.2 we know that L(p − 1S\T + 1T\S) = L(p − 1S + 1T ) ≤
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L(p − 1S) so we have that L(p − 1S\T + 1T\S) ≤ L(p − 1S\T ). Now clearly
(p−1S\T+1T\S)∨p = p+1T\S and (p−1S\T+1T\S)∧p = p−1S\T ; by Lyapunov
submodularity then L(p−1S\T )+L(p+1T\S) ≤ L(p)+L(p−1S\T+1T\S). By the
fact that L(p−1S\T+1T\S) ≤ L(p−1S\T ) we conclude that L(p+1T\S) ≤ L(p)
which is a contradiction to the assumption that WOD(p) = {∅}.
Lemma 5.7 UD(p) 6= ∅ → DD(p) 6= ∅.
Proof For S ∈ UD(p) either S ∈ DD(p) or ∃T ⊆ S such that ∅ 6= T ∈
WOD(p − 1S). But then by Corollary 3.2 we have that L(p − 1S + 1T ) =
L(p− 1S)− lp−1S(T ) + |T | ≤ L(p− 1S) = L(p) + hp(S)− |S| < L(p) where the
first inequality is the fact that T ∈ WOD(p − 1S) and the second comes from
S ∈ UD(p). Hence we conclude that S \T ∈ UD(p); but since T 6= ∅ and T 6= S
we can proceed inductively with S \ T instead of S.
Theorem 5.8 If all valuations are monotone gross substitute then any descend-
ing auction that only updates prices of sets in dearth demand and terminates
only when there is no dearth demand set, will find the maximum Walrasian price
vector.
Lemma 5.9 ∅ 6= S /∈ DD(p)→WOD(p− 1S) 6= {∅}.
Proof If S /∈ DD(p) then either S ∈ UD(p)∧∃T ∈ WOD(p−1S), T 6= ∅, hence
we are done; or S /∈ UD(p), but then, by Corollary 3.2, since L(p) ≤ L(p− 1S),
S ∈ WOD(p− 1S).
6 Conclusion
We introduced two new definitions for monotone gross substitute valuations; in
Paes Leme’s recent survey one can find many more interesting definitions and
elegant characterizations [18].
As noted, our new price characterization generalizes Gul and Stacchetti’s
from envy free price if and only if there is no over demanded set, to Walrasian
price vector if and only if there is no over demanded nor under demanded set. We
showed that minimum and maximum Walrasian prices can also be characterized
using weakly over and under demand definition.
We introduced new frameworks that all ascending and descending auctions
must follow in order to guarantee termination at a minimum or maximum Wal-
rasian. We showed, clearly, that former auctions follow that framework.
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A More known results
Blumrosen and Nisan showed that if a set of gross substitute valuations is not
additive when aggregated then there exists another valuation such that together
there is no ascending auction that finds the maximum social welfare [7]. Gul and
Stacchetti showed that no ascending auction can find a VCG outcome when all
the valuations are gross substitute [12].
Gul and Stacchetti showed also that when valuations are monotone the class
monotone gross substitute is equivalent to the class of monotone single improve-
ment valuations which is defined by the following.
Single improvement [11] A valuation is in the class single improvement if
for every p ∈ Nm and a set of items S /∈ D(p), there exists T ⊆ Ω, such that
up(S) < up(T ), |T \ S| ≤ 1 and |S \ T | ≤ 1.
For non-gross substitute valuations, the following theorem was proved by
Reijnierse et al. [19].
Theorem A.1 (non-gross substitute [19]) For a non-gross substitute valu-
ation of more than two items, ∃q ∈ Nm, A ⊆ Ω, and three items j1, j2, j3 ∈ Ω\A,
such that either D(q) = {A,A ∪ {j1, j2}} or D(q) = {A ∪ {j3}, A ∪ {j1, j2}}.11
When all valuations are gross substitute it can be shown that the maximum
utility function is submodular with respect to the price vector [12]. Hence,
since the Lyapunov is a summation of the maximum utility functions and linear
in the price, the following Lyapunov submodularity can be proved. This result
appears for instance in Ausubel [2]; for a direct and complete proof, see [3].
Lemma A.2 (Lyapunov submodularity [2]) If all valuations are gross sub-
stitute then for any two p, q ∈ Nm, L(p ∧ q) + L(p ∨ q) ≤ L(p) + L(q).
11For valuations of two items it is known that gross substitute is equivalent to submodularity,
hence, the first case holds for non-gross substitute valuations of two items. Therefore, the
restriction of the number of items is only for the sake of representation.
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The notions of maximum Walrasian price vector and minimum Walrasian price
vector are well defined and represent unique price vectors by a direct corollary
to the following lemma.
Lemma A.3 (Walrasian lattice property [12]) If p, q ∈ Nm are two Wal-
rasian price vectors then so is (p ∧ q) and (p ∨ q).
The following result is used in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Theorem A.4 (Theorem 2 in [12]) For monotone gross substitute valuation
and two sets of items S, T such that S ∩ T = ∅ it holds that lp(S) ≥ lp+1T (S).
Ascending auctions for generalized price definitions were suggested, for in-
stance by [16] and [10]. The main difference In the model is allowing non
anonymous nonlinear prices. That is, the price of each set for each bidder can
be arbitrary. Our notion of over-demand is analog to de Vries et. al’s notion of
undersupplied and their notion of minimally undersupplied is analog to a subset
of the excess-demand we define. They propose an ascending auction, for these
relaxed prices, that computes VCG prices for submodular valuations. Mishra
and Parks suggest an ascending auction that uses Walrasian equilibrium in or-
der to find a VCG price for all valuations. Apart from the price relaxations, the
notions of ascending and of Walrasian equilibrium are also relaxed compare to
our definitions.
B Excess demand set system strictly generalizes
(previous definition of) excess demand set
We finish with a lemma which proves that the newly defined set system excess
demand strictly generalizes the known set definition minimal minimizer (also
known as excess demand in [12]).
Lemma B.1 ∃p, S, s.t. S ∈ ED(p) ∧ S is not a minimal minimizer for p.
Proof Assume there are three identical additive bidders and two items they
all evaluate for 1. For p = (0, 0) each singleton is in ED(p) but the minimal
minimizer is the set of both items.
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